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Acute stress may be defined as the realization that the immediate environ-
mental situation has placed demands on an individual which possibly will
not be handled successfully. It differs from chronic stress in that the
demands and the effects of a failure to handle the demands are localized
in time. There are optimal levels of acute stress which cause an optimal
level of arousal and performance. When the level of acute stress exceeds
these levels, accidents occur.
Consider the following hypothetical accidents:
A student pilot in a T-38 starts his engines for a solo flight, but
an alert crew chief notices that the gear doors do not close. When he cannot
communicate the problem to the student, the crew chief has the student shut
down the left engine while the crew chief climbs up to the cockpit to reset
the proper hydraulic switch. Shutting down the engine causes the stability
augmentation system to drop off line. The student then restarts the left
engine and taxis to the runway. He does not reaccomplish the check list,
and takes off with the stability augmentation system off. During the climb,
he notices the lack of a stability augmentation system. He levels off without
reducing power and attempts to engage the stability augmentation system.
In doing so he enters the regime of flight for maximum sensitivity for the
flight controls and a small disturbance produces a vertical pilot induced
oscillation. The aircraft goes through a violent maneuver during which the
bearings on one engine fail. The student manages to recover by letting go
of the stick, and decides (correctly) to shut down the failed engine and
return to base.
During the violent maneuver, the seat cushion has been raised out of
the seat pan, and is now lodged over the forward lip of the pan, tilting
the cushion back and preventing the student from reaching the rudder pedals.
Under the acute stress Of the situation, the student fails to appreciate
the implications of this situation. Without being able to reach the rudder
pedals he will be unable to correct for the yaw during single engine opera-
tion. Upon landing he will be unable to steer the aircraft or to apply the
brakes to stop it.
Under stress, his mental processes narrow down to one factor: Get this
plane back on the ground! He does not remember that the gear will have to
be lowered by the alternate system because he has shut down the engine, which
normally provides hydraulic power for gear extension. In this state, he
also forgets to calculate the correct airspeeds for base turn and final approach,
corrected for his heavy fuel state. Nevertheless, when he contacts the tower
to advise them of the situation, he states that, other than the loss of engine,
he has no problem.
He begins his base turn two miles from the runway, thirty knots below
the correct airspeed, pulling hard on the stick to keep his altitude. The
only thing that keeps him from stalling the aircraft is the hard seat cushion
draped over the seat pan which prevents him from getting the stick full back.
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Realizing the aircraft is slow, he tries to light the afterburner on the
good engine. This is the only way to save the aircraft, but at the low airspeed,
a high power setLing causes the aircraft to yaw and lose lift on one wing.
Unable to correct the yaw or the resulting roll, the student takes the engine
out of after-burner.
The aircraft struck the ground at a high rate of descent, about one
mile from the end of the runway. After surviving this highly stressful accident,
the student stated that the touchdown was mild, but that the gear may have
failedduring the landing roll because he remembered that he didn't have
to climb down very far to exit the cockpit. Actually, the gear sheared off
at ground impact and was thrown over half a mile from the impact site. The
aircraft came to a stop when it plowed into a sand dune, and with sand pouring
over the canopy rail, the student would have had to climb UP to exit the
plane. An excessive level of acute stress can impair mental processes.
In this situation, it is reasonable to conclude that the student was stressed,
despite his apparent lack of concern for the seriousness of the situation.
Stressors do cause stress.
Consider a test pilot who stretches a mission in order to accomplish
the planned maneuvers for a test program which is behind schedule. Enroute
to his recovery base, the last fuel tank fails to feed into the main tank.
The failure is not the pilot's fault, but it was his decision to continue
the test below planned fuel minimums which produced the critical situation
when the failure occurred. He declares an emergency and heads for the nearest
usable runway. He is the recognized expert on this aircraft, and was the
pilot who developed and tested the precautionary flame out pattern. Upset
with himself because he will not recover as planned, he misreads his airspeed
by 100 knots, decides not to go around because of his low fuel state, and
runs off the far end of the runway. The situation should have been routine
for this pilot. It should not have caused an excessive amount of stress,
but it did. The stress was self imposed.
Consider an instructor pilot with previous experience in an aircraft
which had a tendency to blow up when the engine caught fire. Suppose he
lost a few close friends because they were a bit slow in deciding to eject.
Now, put this pilot in a new aircraft with a student. Give him a fire light.
Let him roll into a tight turn and ask the student if he sees smoke trailing
behind the aircraft. Introduce a student who is not familiar with the conden-
sation that forms in the wingtip vortex under a high g turn. The student
reports the "smoke" that he was instructed to see. Student and instructor
both eject safely. The airplane crashes - unnecessarily. The stress on
the instructor was acute and severe. It may also have contributed to the
student's error. A fire light in the trainer aircraft was not supposed to
cause that much stress. The fact that it did underlines the previous conclusion:
stress is self imposed.
Consider a student pilot in a T-37 on an initial solo flight away from
the traffic pattern. During a practice approach to a stall, the left wing
drops. He becomes preoccupied with raising the wing, using both ailero_
and rudder. This causes the approach to a stall to become a full stall and
enter a spin to the right. The entry to a spin from a level attitude can
be disorienting and frightening, especially when it is unintentional. Since
the last recognizable attitude was left wing low, it should not be surprising
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to learn that this stressed individual thought that he had entered a spin
to the left. Since we have learned that stress tends to impair the mental
process, it is understandable that the presence of a ball that is fully deflected
to the left was interpreted as evidence confirming the "left" spin. In the
T-37 aircraft, the ball on the left turn and slip indicator always moves
left in any spin. Weshould not be surprised to learn that the airplane
crashed. Amazingly, the student pilot did eject in time to survive.
Not all pilots survive stressful situations. Consider the pilot of
Blue Four, the fourth aircraft in a formation scheduled to practice a bombing
attack during marginal weather. The planned activity was radar bombing, which
can be accomplished quite well in poor weather. When in actual combat situations,
radar bombing is done one ship at a time; during peacetime, we fly to a range
in formation. It's not supposed to be more hazardous in formation; it Just
turned out that way. In addition to watching his radar scope inside the
cockpit, number four in a formation must also watch out for the other aircraft
in formation. One more thing: in the interest of range safety, the pilots
on this flight were required to acquire the target visually to insure that
they did not drop bombs on the wrong target. In combat, that's not required.
Radar bombing of unseen targets at night and in weather is often accomplished.
Blue Four proceeds to the target area, watching outside for the rest
of the formation, watching his radar scope for the target, and trying to
look outside to visually identify the target. The weather is marginal.
The flight leader breaks up the formation on the range and begins his run.
He has a good radar return, but cannot identify the target visually. Blue
TWo and Three make their runs with the s_e results. The leader decides
to abort the bombing mission and calls for the flight to rejoin. Two and
Three manage to find their leader, but Blue Four does not answer. He has
crashed, wings level, slightly nose low, looking for the target - or for
the rest of the formation. We'll never know. Blue flight returned without
him.
We are reasonably sure that Blue Four was overstressed because we can
talk with the other members of the flight, and they were stressed. We do
not know howmany of this year's accidents occurred because of stress. We
can't always talk with the people involved. However, we are reasonably sure
that acute stress is a factor in aircraft accidents.
Aviation will always provide a stressful environment. We probably can't
change that, but before a stressful environment can result in an accident,
the human must impose a level of stress upon himself, and then fail to handle
the combination of the situation and the stress, resulting in a measurable
strain: a failure in the system.
Against this background, there are some questions to consider:
Can we identify an individual who is under stress?
Can we keep a person with chronic stress away from stressful situations?
Are chronic and acute stress additive in nature?
Can we determine how much stress a specific individual can tolerate
before a strain results?
Can we reduce the stress before a strain results?
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There maynot be answers to these questions at present. They serve
to define a problem. If we can agree on the problem and can understand the
importance of solving the problem, then we have taken the first step towards
its solution.
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